Executive Summary
The strategic convergence between Russia, Iran, and
China poses a growing systemic threat to the European Union. Despite differing
regional agendas, these three powers are increasingly aligned in key areas such
as cybersecurity, military technology transfers, intelligence cooperation, and
disinformation campaigns. Their coordinated efforts undermine the EU’s critical
infrastructure, weaken its strategic autonomy, and erode trust in democratic
institutions by targeting sectors such as energy, finance, healthcare, and
electoral integrity. Although the EU has implemented sanctions and reinforced
its cybersecurity framework, it continues to address these actors largely in
isolation, failing to recognize the cumulative security impact of their
trilateral cooperation. Particular vulnerabilities include the transfer of
advanced knowledge and dual-use technologies via academic and industrial
partnerships with China, the use of hybrid warfare tactics by Iran—including
cyberattacks and propaganda—and Russia’s ongoing infiltration of European
digital networks and information ecosystems. To address this, the EU must adopt
a coherent, forward-looking strategythat moves
beyond fragmented responses. This entails the establishment of a centralized
threat assessment hub coordinating intelligence from Member States, the
restriction of academic and technological partnerships with high-risk third
countries, the reinforcement of cyber resilience through joint infrastructure
protection drills with NATO, and the creation of a targeted investment
mechanism to reduce dependency on foreign critical technologies. These concrete
instruments, when integrated, can strengthen Europe’s defense capabilities,
reduce strategic dependencies, and safeguard its democratic and technological
sovereignty.
Policy Recommendations
- The EU should
adopt a coherent strategy to counter foreign interference, especiallyconsidering threats originating from China, Russia
and Iran.
- The EU should
implement the European Parliament’s recommendations on protecting democratic
processes from disinformation, fake news and external influence.
- It is imperative
to strengthen the EU’s cyber defense systems, boost resources to counter
cyberespionage by China, Russia and Iran and deepen its cooperation with NATO
on critical infrastructure protection.
- The balance
between cooperation and protection must be upheld, especially in light of the
academic and cultural cooperation with countries such as China.
Introduction
The growing cooperation between China, Russia, and
Iran in the fields of cybersecurity and intelligence represents a systemic
threat to the stability and security of the European Union. Although these
three states differ in their geopolitical priorities, they converge around a
shared strategic objective: to weaken the European Union by destabilizing it
across multiple domains, ranging from military pressure to technological
interference. This trilateral alignment is underpinned by several key
mechanisms, including the exchange of intelligence, the transfer of advanced
technologies, coordinated cyberattacks, and mutual political and technological
support. China, in particular, provides Russia and Iran with dual-use
technologies—such as semiconductors, surveillance systems, and software
employed in intelligence operations—thereby acting as a technological enabler
for their subversive agendas. Joint efforts extend to the realm of information
warfare, notably disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining democratic
institutions within the EU and eroding the political and social cohesion of its
member states. While Russia plays a leading role in launching cyberattacks and
penetrating Western institutions, Iran contributes through both cyber
capabilities and ideological amplification, particularly via proxy networks and
targeted disinformation. China, meanwhile, facilitates systemic disruption
through long-term knowledge and technology extraction, and by enabling the
operational capacity of its partners through advanced infrastructure. Thus,
each actor contributes differently: Russia leads tactical cyber aggression,
Iran amplifies narratives and supports militant proxies, and China sustains the
strategic backbone through access, innovation, and industrial leverage. Although
the EU has acknowledged some of these risks, significant blind spots
remain—particularly in areas of academic, technological, and economic
cooperation—where mechanisms of infiltration often go unnoticed. These blind
spots are systematically exploited, not only through espionage and
disinformation, but also through legitimate-seeming collaborations in science,
trade, and infrastructure. Against this backdrop, the coordinated actions of
Russia, Iran, and China constitute one of the most pressing challenges to
European security, necessitating a comprehensive and unified response.
Evidence and dimensions of the tripartite cooperation
An analysis of available sources
indicates that the cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China stems from a
shared strategic calculus. Each of these states views the European Union as a
geopolitical adversary and a structural barrier to the realization of their
respective ambitions on the international stage.
Cybersecurity: Russia, Iran, and China – Cooperation and Threats to the
European Union"
In recent years, trilateral
cooperation in the cyber domain has intensified. Russia, Iran, and China have
been exchanging cyber technologies, conducting joint hacking operations,
coordinating ransomware attacks, and launching disinformation campaigns
targeting strategic sectors of the EU economy. This section examines the
mechanisms of this cooperation in order to identify the key threats and their
implications for Europe’s digital security.
Russia, Iran,
and China are actively developing joint cyberattack strategies. In January
2025, Iran and Russia signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement
that includes provisions for cybersecurity collaboration. This agreement
focuses on coordinated efforts to counter the misuse of information and
communication technologies and to manage national internet segments, thereby
expanding state control over the digital space[1].
Meanwhile, China and Russia have deepened their cybersecurity partnership by
aligning their technical capacities and legal frameworks. Their goal is to
promote a new cyber order based on state sovereignty and collective security,
positioning themselves as leaders in the global digital arena[2].
The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has
consistently identified Russia, China, and Iran as persistent cyber threats.
According to the 2025 Threat Assessment Report, these states possess both the
technical capabilities and political intent to launch operations targeting
critical infrastructure and democratic institutions. The 2025 Threat Assessment
highlights these nations' capabilities and willingness to launch cyber
operations that could disrupt U.S. national security[3].
Iran has implemented Russian techniques to mask cybercrime and is using China's
digital surveillance model to create its own sanctions evasion and surveillance
systems[4].
Between 2021 and 2024, cyberattacks by Iranian hackers increased by 40%, with
the majority targeting EU state institutions and the financial sector. China,
in turn, provides Russia and Iran with advanced espionage technologies and
tools that are used to attack European critical infrastructure systems[5].
In 2022, Chinese surveillance systems enabled the infiltration of European
telecommunications networks and financial services. In addition, Russia and
China regularly launch cyberattacks on the European energy, financial and
transport sectors[6]. In
2023, more than 60% of cyberattacks against EU institutions originated from
entities linked to Russian and Chinese cybercriminal groups. One of the most
destructive attacks was the infection of the power system in Central Europe,
which led to many hours of power outages[7].
Iran also plays a key role in the development of cybercrime in the EU. In 2022,
Iranian hackers launched 140 ransomware attacks on organizations in the EU,
generating financial losses of more than €1.2 billion. These attacks mainly
affected the health, banking, and transportation sectors, and were designed to
encrypt data and extort ransom[8].
Russian and Chinese intelligence agencies cooperate intensively in the areas of
cyberespionage, data interception and infiltration of EU information systems[9].
In 2023, 25% of detected data breaches in the EU resulted from actions
sponsored by third countries, mainly China and Russia. Iran provides hacking
tools to take over administrative accounts in European organizations[10].
One of the examples is the 2023 operation in which Iranian hackers used forged
security certificates to gain access to EU banking systems, causing the data of
4 million users to be leaked. In addition to the hacking attacks, Russia, Iran
and China are conducting coordinated disinformation campaigns to further destabilize
Europe[11].
In 2022, more than 500 disinformation campaigns were detected that aimed to
undermine EU citizens' trust in their governments and international
institutions. In 2023, a media campaign was organized to spread information
about alleged "secret agreements" between EU governments and
pharmaceutical corporations[12].
In conclusion,
Russia, Iran, and China are not only exchanging technologies to facilitate
cybercrime but are also executing coordinated digital operations that directly
threaten the European Union. The greatest danger lies in the proliferation of
ransomware, cyberespionage, and disinformation activities—tools deliberately
used to destabilize the EU economy and disrupt societal cohesion by undermining
trust in public institutions and critical sectors such as healthcare.
Knowledge and Technology Transfer: Cooperation between Russia, Iran, and
China and the Threats to the European Union.
The transfer
of knowledge and technology between Russia, Iran, and China constitutes a key
pillar of their joint strategy to enhance geopolitical influence and mitigate
the impact of Western sanctions. This cooperation operates through formal state
partnerships as well as informal and opaque channels—including “private”
actors, front companies, and academic institutions—often routed through
jurisdictions such as Hong Kong to mask state involvement. China, for example,
has provided Russia with critical components such as microelectronics and
processors essential for the production of missiles and precision-guided
munitions. In exchange, Russia has shared advanced military technologies with
China, including submarine and stealth capabilities. Similarly, Iran has
supplied Russia with ballistic missiles, potentially receiving sensitive
technological assistance in exchange[13].
The consequences of this strategic partnership are particularly severe for the European Union, which
academic, research, and industrial institutions are not only targeted directly,
but are often exploited through seemingly legitimate joint projects.The
European Parliament has explicitly acknowledged that foreign interference and
espionage activities have intensified within EU academic institutions, with
China, Russia, and Iran identified as primary perpetrators.[14]
Due to the strategic value of their advanced scientific research and
technological innovation, these institutions have become prime targets for
foreign intelligence activities. The European Parliament has acknowledged
that EU universities are being targeted by foreign interference and espionage,
notably from China, Russia, or Iran. These actions calling for concrete actions such as stricter eligibility
criteria for EU-funded research projects, the creation of a centralized risk
assessment mechanism, enhanced background checks for foreign-affiliated
researchers, and stronger enforcement of export controls in sensitive
technological domains. Despite warnings from MI5 about potential espionage
threats, several British universities have continued collaborations with
Chinese institutions linked to the defense sector[15].
Russia and
Iran have been developing intensive academic and research cooperation for
years. Between 2017 and 2019, more than 35,000 Chinese students studied in
Russia, and more than 20,000 Russians studied in China[16].
This figures, while notable, remain significantly lower than Chinese student
populations in countries such as the United States (over 350,000 during the
same period) and in Germany (over 35,000 annually), highlighting the
strategic—not commercial—dimension of these cooperation. Exchange programs
include fields such as artificial intelligence, cryptography, and advanced
information systems, which can have both civilian and military applications. As
part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization University and BRICS University,
these countries fund research on cybersecurity, quantum engineering and
military systems[17]. While
presented as academic partnerships, they serve as mechanisms for the transfer
of strategic knowledge that may be leveraged in hybrid warfare. For the
European Union, such cooperation poses a growing threat, as it facilitates the
accumulation and circulation of sensitive expertise
among actors known to challenge the international rules-based order. The
integration of academic infrastructure into broader geopolitical strategies
risks undermining Europe’s technological edge and security architecture.
The European
Union finds itself at the center of global technological competition. In 2023,
as many as 25% of cyberattacks on academic institutions in the EU were aimed at
stealing quantum engineering and artificial intelligence research[18].
The leakage of such technologies may result in a significant increase in the
military potential of Russia, Iran and China, which in the long run will weaken
the strategic advantage of the West.
Transfer of Military and Industrial Technologies
A key pillar
of strategic cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China is the transfer of
military and dual-use industrial technologies. China has supplied Russia with
90% of imported microelectronics components, which are crucial for the Russian
defense industry[19]. In
addition, China has provided Russia with parts for missile systems and drones,
helping to modernize its military equipment[20].
Iran also plays a significant role in the Russian defense industry, providing
Moscow with more than 4,600 Shahed drones that have been used on the Ukrainian
front[21].
In return, Russia provides Iran with radar systems, combat aircraft, and air
defense technologies[22].
In addition, Iran and Russia have started building a drone factory in
Tatarstan, which is expected to produce 6,000 drones by 2025[23].
Not only the military sector, but also the industrial sector is the subject of
intensive cooperation. China has increased its share of the Russian machinery
and machine tool market from 13% in 2017 to 90% in 2023[24].
This dependency allows Russia to evade Western sanctions and keep military
production high. Iran and Russia are also working on payment systems that
bypass SWIFT, allowing them to trade in rubles and riyals[25].
Such mechanisms weaken the effectiveness of EU sanctions, increasing the
economic self-sufficiency of these countries.
Sino-Iranian support for Russia.
After Russia's
invasion of Ukraine in 2022, cooperation on the sharing of military and
industrial technologies between Russia, China and Iran has become a key element
of the Kremlin's survival strategy, which has come under Western sanctions.
Iran provides Russia with drones, China supports the modernization of the
Russian defense industry, and Moscow returns the favor by providing advanced
military technologies to partners. As a result, the threat to both the
stability of the region and European security is increasing[26].
China is the most important supplier of electronic components to the Russian
defense industry. In 2023, 90% of the microelectronics imported by Russia came
from China, which was crucial for the modernization of its armed forces[27].
China also supplies ball bearings, machine tools, and precision machinery,
which are essential for the production of tanks and combat aircraft[28].In addition, Russia and China are developing
cooperation in the production of combat drones. In the first half of 2023,
Chinese companies provided Russia with drones worth $14.5 million. Although
Beijing officially denies reports that it directly supports the Russian
military, an analysis of import statistics indicates that military equipment
arrives in Moscow through intermediary companies in Hong Kong[29]. Iran, in turn, plays a key role in supplying Russia
with combat drones. Since 2022, Moscow has received at least 4600 Shahed-136
drones, which have been used to attack Ukrainian cities and critical
infrastructure[30]. In
2024, Iran has also supplied Russia with 400 Fateh-110 ballistic missiles,
capable of striking targets at distances of up to 700 kilometers (approximately
435 miles).
In an effort
to reduce dependence on external suppliers, Russia and Iran have jointly
initiated the construction of a drone production facility in Tatarstan, with a
projected output of 6,000 drones annually by 2025. These new
industrial facilities are expected to enable Moscow to sustain its military
operations in Ukraine, while simultaneously enhancing Iran’s capacity to expand
arms exports to other countries in the Middle East. Moscow, however, is not
merely a beneficiary in this partnership; in exchange for drones and missiles,
it provides Iran with advanced radar systems, combat aircraft, and
sophisticated air defense technologies. Iran received Russian attack
helicopters, radars and fighter planes, which significantly increased its
defense capabilities[31].
In 2023, Iran assisted Russia in constructing a drone production facility in
Yelabuga, located in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, with the aim of
producing approximately 6,000 Shahed-136 drones by mid-2025. The facility is
intended to ensure a continuous supply of drones for Russia’s military
operations in Ukraine, while simultaneously enhancing Iran’s capacity to
increase arms exports to other Middle Eastern countries[32].
Given Tehran's ambitions to become a dominant power in Central Asia,
strengthening its military potential should not be underestimated. Iran views the region as a strategically vital
sphere of influence. According to the Institute for the Study of War, Tehran
considers much of Central Asia to be part of its "near abroad"—a
space where it seeks to assert both cultural and strategic presence. This
perspective drives Tehran's efforts to establish a stronger presence in the
area[33].
Russia,
in turn, shares its expertise in the modernization of drones and missile
systems, enabling Iran to improve its indigenous technological capabilities. As
a result, Tehran is not only reinforcing its own defense posture, but also
expanding its ability to export modern weapons systems to partners such as
Syria and the Yemeni Houthis. China also benefits from this trilateral
exchange. It continues to gain access to advanced Russian military
technologies, particularly in the areas of aircraft engines and missile
systems. Notably, more than 40% of China’s current fighter jet fleet still
relies on Russian engines[34].
While Beijing has taken steps to reduce this dependency, including efforts to
develop its own advanced propulsion technologies, it remains unable to achieve
full self-sufficiency in this sector[35].
The transfer
of military technology between Russia, Iran and China poses a serious threat to
the European Union. In 2023, Russia used Chinese components to modernize more
than 200 tanks and produce modern fire control systems. This enhancement of
Russia’s offensive capabilities risks escalating conflicts in Eastern Europe
and further deteriorating the security situation in Ukraine. Iran, in turn, may
utilize newly acquired technologies to threaten European maritime
infrastructure in the Mediterranean and to advance its missile
program—developments that raise significant concerns for both the EU and NATO.
In January 2025, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) conducted the
"Prophet Muhammad" naval exercise in the Persian Gulf. The exercise
featured the deployment of advanced combat drones such as the Mohajer-6 and
Ababil-5, equipped with AI-enhanced Qaem and Almas missiles. These systems
successfully destroyed simulated targets, demonstrating Iran’s growing capacity
to integrate artificial intelligence and high-precision technologies into its
military operations[36].
In March 2025, Iran participated in the "Security Belt-2025" joint
naval exercises alongside Russia and China in the Gulf of Oman. The drills
involved more than 20 warships and featured a series of coordinated operations,
including simulated maritime attacks, joint search and rescue missions, and
vessel inspection procedures. The primary objective was to enhance military
interoperability among the three states and to signal their increasing
coordination in strategic maritime zones[37].
Iran has also incorporated Russian-made long-range air defense systems, such as
the S-300, into its own military exercises. In February 2025, these systems
were deployed to intercept simulated hostile targets, demonstrating Iran’s
growing capacity to integrate advanced foreign technologies into its national
defense architecture[38].
The trilateral military-technical cooperation between
Russia, Iran, and China—particularly in the field of weapons systems and joint
exercises—carries significant implications for global and regional security. Such
developments are particularly alarming in light of Iran’s provision of
ballistic missiles to Russia and China’s continued supply of dual-use
components that are critical to sustaining Russian defense production[39].
In this trilateral framework, China provides Russia with key electronic
components, Iran supplies drones and ballistic missiles, and in return, Moscow
shares advanced military technologies with both partners. This reciprocal
exchange has significantly enhanced the military capabilities of all three
countries. Moreover, their increasingly assertive defense and foreign policies
pose a growing challenge to the stability and security of the European Union.
Espionage: Cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China and Its Threats
to the European Union
Intelligence
cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China represents one of the most critical
threats to the security of the European Union. This trilateral partnership has
intensified efforts to spy on European governmental, academic, and corporate
institutions. The scope of this cooperation encompasses a wide range of
intelligence practices, from traditional methods such as agent recruitment and
institutional infiltration to advanced cyber techniques, including data
exfiltration and the manipulation of public opinion through social media
platforms. Key mechanisms driving this partnership include the coordinated
exchange of surveillance technologies, the execution of joint cyber operations,
and mutual support in orchestrating large-scale disinformation campaigns. Collectively,
these activities pose an escalating threat to the internal stability and
strategic autonomy of the European Union and its member states. The European
External Action Service (EEAS) identifies Russia and China as the principal
foreign actors engaged in information manipulation that undermines both EU
security and democratic governance. According to EEAS reports, such activities
involve disinformation, information distortion, and deliberate interference in
the EU’s information space[40].
A joint report by MERICS, Chatham House, and the German Marshall Fund analyzes
the growing strategic alignment between China and Russia and its implications
for European security. The report underscores the deepening cooperation in the
fields of military technology, cybersecurity, and disinformation—areas that
collectively pose a destabilizing risk to the European region[41].
Moreover, Russia, Iran, and China are engaged in regular intelligence exchange,
which enhances their capacity to conduct coordinated operations against the
European Union and NATO structures more effectively. Intelligence documents
from 2023 reveal that Tehran and Moscow are conducting joint operations to
infiltrate Western academic and research institutions[42].
In turn, the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) cooperates with the
Russian FSB in analyzing the activities of European foreign policy think tanks[43].
Cyberspace has
become a central domain of intelligence cooperation between Russia, Iran, and
China[44].
In 2023, Chinese state-sponsored hackers conducted 104 cyberattacks targeting
European government institutions and high-tech corporations[45].
In one of the largest attacks in 2022, Chinese cybercriminals broke into the
systems of the EU's technology research agency, stealing data on artificial
intelligence and cryptography[46].
Simultaneously, Russian hackers—often operating in coordination with Iranian
cyber units—have conducted operations against European critical infrastructure.
In a high-profile case, they infected power grid systems in several EU member
states, causing regional disruptions. Analysts from Europol and NATO report that recent cyberattacks
attributed to Russia, Iran, and China have not only disrupted critical economic
sectors in the EU but have also exposed vulnerabilities in the Union’s
defensive and response mechanisms—suggesting a potential intent to probe
Europe’s cyber resilience[47]. According to Europol’s 2025 annual
report, the European Union is facing an increase in politically motivated
cyberattacks and sabotage, primarily driven by state actors such as Russia[48]. The report
details how “hybrid threat” networks are increasingly collaborating with
organized crime groups to destabilize the EU. These operations include
sabotage, arson, cyber intrusions, data theft, migrant smuggling, and other
forms of strategic criminal activity. EU and Polish officials have publicly
cited examples of recent cyberattacks on hospitals and acts of arson linked to
Russian military intelligence. The report further highlights the evolving
nature of these threats, emphasizing the use of artificial intelligence in
cybercrime and the recruitment of young people for online fraud schemes. Europol
warns that such hybrid threats are designed to undermine democratic
institutions, social cohesion, and the rule of law within the European Union[49].
In December 2024, NATO announced a series of new measures aimed at
strengthening the protection of Europe’s critical infrastructure, following a
wave of sabotage-related incidents, including data cable disruptions in Sweden,
Finland, and other locations. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte identified
Russia and China as potential sources of these threats and stressed the
importance of enhanced intelligence sharing and infrastructure defense across
member states. As part of these efforts, a dedicated maritime exercise known as
“Frozen Winds” was conducted, involving the use of underwater drones and
minesweeper vessels to improve detection and monitoring capabilities in
vulnerable maritime zones. These initiatives reflect NATO’s growing recognition
of the strategic risks posed by state-sponsored cyber and hybrid operations
aimed at destabilizing the region[50].
China and
Russia have been conducting intelligence operations for years, the aim of which
is to acquire modern technologies from Europe. Since 2000, 224 cases of Chinese
espionage against Western scientific institutions and technology companies have
been documented[51]. An
example of such an operation was the infiltration of a German university of
technology in 2021, where Chinese agents obtained data on modern materials for
semiconductor production[52].
Iran, in turn, uses its intelligence networks to obtain knowledge from European
technical universities. Between 2019 and 2023, Iranians conducted infiltration
operations at least 10 universities in the EU, which allowed them to gain
access to research on missile technologies[53].
Russia, Iran and China regularly recruit agents in Europe, using various
methods of pressure. In 2022, a Russian spy network in EU institutions was
discovered that had access to classified documents on sanctions imposed on
Moscow[54].
China, in turn, infiltrates European technology corporations, recruiting
employees to illegally transfer patents and industrial secrets. Between 2015
and 2021, more than 1200 cases of intellectual property theft were disclosed by
European courts[55]. Russia, Iran and China are conducting
coordinated disinformation operations aimed at weakening the unity of the
European Union. In 2023, the European External Action Service (EEAS)
documented over 750 incidents of Foreign Information Manipulation and
Interference (FIMI) within the European Union. These coordinated disinformation
campaigns were designed to
erode public trust in EU institutions, undermine support for sanctions against
Russia, and destabilize the political landscape of member states[56].
In 2023, Russian influence operations reached more than 50 million users in
Europe[57].
Iran focuses on anti-EU propaganda, especially in the context of Middle East
policy. In 2022, Iranian state media conducted a disinformation campaign
against EU sanctions imposed on Tehran[58].
In April 2025, the French government formally accused the Russian military
intelligence agency, GRU, of orchestrating a series of cyberattacks between
2021 and 2024. These attacks targeted various French entities, including
government ministries, local authorities, aerospace and financial sectors, and
notably, an organization involved in organizing the 2024 Paris Olympic and
Paralympic Games. The French cybersecurity agency, ANSSI, reported that these
cyberattacks were carried out by the hacking group APT28, also known as Fancy
Bear, which is linked to the GRU. The primary objective of these operations was
intelligence gathering, particularly in the context of Russia's ongoing war in
Ukraine. The French Foreign Ministry specifically identified GRU Unit 20728 as
responsible for these activities. France condemned these destabilizing actions
and emphasized its commitment to collaborating with international partners to
counter such malicious cyber behavior[59].
The
intelligence cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China constitutes one of the
most serious and multidimensional threats to the European Union. Their
coordinated activities encompass cyberattacks, academic infiltration, agent
recruitment, and large-scale disinformation campaigns targeting critical
institutions and societal trust. In response, the European Union must
significantly enhance its security posture by strengthening counterintelligence
capabilities, investing in cybersecurity and data protection infrastructure,
and adopting a more strategic approach to limiting foreign influence in key
economic and political sectors.
The European Union’s Response to Trilateral
Cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China
Strategic Awareness of the Threat
The European Parliament report (A9-0164/2022) draws attention to the
growing awareness of the threats posed by Russia, China, and Iran to the
European Union’s security and democratic resilience[60]. However, the report also
highlights a persistent gap between the recognition of specific risks and the
acknowledgment of the broader strategic challenge arising from the trilateral
cooperation among these actors. According to the document, Russia’s war against
Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped the EU’s security outlook, leading to an
unprecedented mobilization of military, economic, and diplomatic resources. The
report identifies China’s economic and diplomatic support for Russia as a
potential long-term threat to European security. Iran’s destabilizing role is
also addressed, particularly in relation to arms transfers to Russia and
state-sponsored cyber activities. Nevertheless, the European Union’s
institutional response remains selective and, at times, fragmented. In response
to China’s indirect support for Russia’s war effort, the EU has introduced
targeted sanctions against Chinese entities involved in the provision of
dual-use goods to Russia. These steps, while significant, have been implemented
with caution—reflecting the Union’s broader strategic considerations and
complex economic interdependence with China. Notably, in 2024, the EU proposed
new sanctions on Chinese companies supplying sensitive technologies to Russia,
marking a deliberate shift towards more assertive policy measures[61].
The European Union’s awareness of
the threat posed by the trilateral cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China
is reflected in its measures across five key areas: sanctions and
countermeasures, military and intelligence cooperation, cybersecurity, diplomacy,
and economic policy. However, given the EU’s strong identity as an economic
bloc, addressing these security challenges often requires reconciling
protective measures with entrenched business interests. Recent policy debates
highlight the need for clearer legal frameworks and stronger enforcement
mechanisms to ensure that security imperatives are not overridden by economic
considerations—particularly in sensitive sectors such as energy, critical
technologies, and infrastructure. Recognizing the growing challenge to its security and
strategic autonomy, the EU has adopted a broad set of measures aimed at
limiting the influence of these actors and reducing their ability to carry out aggressive
operations. A central
pillar of this strategy involves the imposition of economic and financial
restrictions. These measures include asset freezes and travel bans targeting
individuals and entities supporting Russian aggression, the disconnection of
Russian banks from the SWIFT system, export bans on military and dual-use
technologies, as well as trade restrictions in the energy, transport, and raw
materials sectors[62]. In addition,
the European Union is cooperating with global digital platforms to curb the
spread of false or misleading content promoting Russo-Chinese
narratives—particularly those that
delegitimize EU’s support for Ukraine, portray Western sanctions as
ineffective, and amplify anti-NATO sentiments. Since 2022, this cooperation has
intensified in response to coordinated disinformation waves following Russia’s
full-scale invasion of Ukraine and amid China’s parallel efforts to frame the
EU as economically dependent and geopolitically divided. This
initiative complements broader disinformation countermeasures and reflects the
EU’s commitment to safeguarding the integrity of its information environment[63].
The third
pillar of the Union’s strategic response involves sanctions targeting Iranian
entities responsible for arms transfers. These measures address Iran’s active
support for Russia, including the delivery of combat drones and technological
assistance to its defense sector. The EU has imposed restrictions on Iranian
companies involved in the production and export of weapons and has banned the
export of technologies that could reinforce Iran’s military capabilities[64].
In addition, the European Union has strengthened intelligence cooperation with
the United States and the United Kingdom to more effectively monitor and
counter Iranian activities in the military and intelligence domains. This
coordination focuses on three key priorities: deepening strategic ties with
NATO, enhancing transatlantic intelligence sharing, and advancing the EU’s strategic
autonomy in the field of defense. Within the broader framework of EU–NATO
cooperation, particular emphasis has been placed on improving the coordination
of military operations, including the development of rapid response
capabilities among member states[65].
A third joint EU–NATO declaration is planned with the aim of strengthening the
coherence and coordination of collective defense efforts across Europe[66].
In parallel, the European Union is working to enhance intelligence sharing
between member states and EU institutions. Notably, recent reports emphasize
the need to increase both the financial and technological capacities of
EU-level intelligence structures. This is part of a broader effort to reinforce
the Union’s strategic autonomy—understood as the ability to act independently
in defense matters while maintaining strong partnerships with NATO and other
allies. The importance of investing in the European defense industry and
developing military capabilities based on domestic resources is also
highlighted[67]. The
European Union has also taken concrete steps to strengthen cybersecurity and
counter hybrid threats, particularly in response to Russian and Chinese
state-sponsored disinformation and cyberattacks. As part of its efforts to
combat disinformation, the EU is reinforcing the role of
the East StratCom Task Force, which monitors and counters coordinated
propaganda campaigns originating from Russia and China. For example, in 2024,
the Task Force exposed multiple disinformation waves related to EU sanctions policy
and vaccine safety, highlighting how false or manipulated content is used to
amplify hostile narratives. The Task Force distinguishes between broader
strategic narratives—such as framing the EU as weak or divided—and specific
disinformation incidents that involve verifiably false claims designed to
mislead or incite public distrust.[68]
To counter
the manipulation of public opinion through social media and other dissemination
tools, the EU is also developing strategic communication frameworks aimed at
increasing societal resilience to external influence[69].
Established under the NIS 2 Directive, the European Cyber Crisis Liaison Organization
Network (EU-CyCLONe) facilitates cooperation among national authorities
responsible for cyber crisis management. The network is designed to ensure a
coordinated and timely response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents across
the European Union[70].
Recognizing the growing threat landscape, the EU has emphasized the need to
further enhance its defense capabilities against cyberattacks. This includes the development of a systemic approach to early threat
detection and response mechanisms, involving all member states in a unified
framework[71]. In
its foreign policy, the European Union also highlights the importance of
reducing economic dependence on China—particularly in critical areas such as
supply chains, advanced technologies, and access to rare earth elements. To
address this, the EU is working to diversify sources of raw materials and
strengthen its own industrial base. At the same time, it underscores the need
to intensify cooperation with democratic partners to avoid strategic
dependencies on authoritarian regimes. This multi-dimensional support for
Ukraine is not only a response to Russia’s direct military aggression but also
forms part of the EU’s broader strategy to counter the systemic threat posed by
the trilateral alignment of Russia, Iran, and China, which jointly seek to
undermine European security and stability. Parallel to these efforts, the EU
has consistently provided support to Ukraine in the form of military,
financial, and humanitarian assistance. This includes arms deliveries under the
European Peace Facility (EPF), reflecting a broader commitment to regional
security and stability. As part of a broader assistance package, the so-called
"Team Europe"—comprising the European Union and its Member States—has
mobilized a total of €143 billion in support of Ukraine. This amount includes
macro-financial assistance, allocations from the Ukraine Facility, humanitarian
aid, and military support delivered both through the European Peace Facility
(EPF) and directly by individual Member States[72].
In the field of humanitarian assistance, the European Union has delivered
over 154,000 tonnes of in-kind aid, including medical equipment, field
hospitals, temporary shelters, school buses, ambulances, and nearly 8,900 power
generators. This support has been coordinated via the EU Civil Protection
Mechanism, with the participation of 35 countries[73].
Deficits in Threat Perception and Strategic
Awareness
There are several areas in which the European Union has yet to fully
recognize or respond to the long-term threat posed by the trilateral
cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China. The first area of concern lies in
the absence of a decisive EU
response to China’s dual strategic role. Despite China’s consistent support for Russia—both economically and
diplomatically—the EU remains reluctant to frame China as a systemic
adversary. As a result, critical economic dependencies persist, particularly in
the fields of advanced technology and strategic raw materials, while the Union
lacks a long-term strategy to reduce these structural vulnerabilities. The second area relates to the EU’s
limited response to Iranian hybrid tactics. While official documents
acknowledge Iran’s activities in cyberspace, its military partnerships, and its
provision of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia, the corresponding EU countermeasures
remain fragmented and insufficient.
However, the most fundamental weakness is the lack of a unified recognition
of the coordinated threat posed by the trilateral cooperation itself.Although
the EU acknowledges interactions among Russia, Iran, and China, it continues to
address them primarily in bilateral or isolated terms. Consequently, there is no
comprehensive EU policy framework that accounts for the cumulative and systemic
impact of their strategic alignment on European security.
Recommendations
To effectively address the complex and evolving
threats posed by foreign interference—particularly from the People’s Republic
of China—the European Union must adopt a coherent and forward-looking strategy.
Such a strategy should integrate existing policy instruments, promote
institutional alignment, and enhance coordination among Member States and EU
bodies. The following recommendations outline concrete measures aimed at
strengthening the Union’s resilience against disinformation, espionage, and
other forms of hybrid interference.
First, the European
Union should take active steps to counter foreign interference by implementing the recommendations and initiatives outlined in the various European
Parliament resolutions concerning interference in democratic processes within
the EU, including disinformation.
Second, the European
Union should pursue a more coordinated and strategic approach to the protection
of critical infrastructure at the EU level, particularly in response to growing
risks associated with Chinese influence. This includes limiting external control,
countering hybrid threats such as cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns,
surveillance of the Chinese diaspora, and espionage operations originating from
and taking place within the EU. This approach must prioritize security
considerations over purely economic interests and involve close cooperation
with international partners to promote a global, open, stable, and secure
cyberspace. To that end, the EU should increase
resourcesallocated to both EU institutions and Member States for defending
against cyberespionage conducted by the People’s Republic of China and formally
call on China to cease such activities.
Furthermore, the EU
should enhance cooperation with NATO and like-minded partners to reduce the
risk of espionage and interference in critical infrastructure—particularly
assets with military relevance. Finally, Key EU institutions—such as the
European Commission and its executive agencies managing Horizon Europe and
other research frameworks—should be urged to halt funding and collaboration
with Chinese companies involved in sectors of critical and strategic importance,
including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and
cybersecurity. Recent reviews have shown that several Chinese entities have
participated in EU-funded projects despite growing security concerns.[74]
Finally, the European
Union should ensure a unified and coherent approach to cultural and academic
cooperation with China, with safeguards in place to prevent undue influence stemming from Chinese
financial involvement. This
includes investigating the current state of research cooperation between EU and
Chinese institutions to ensure that such partnerships are not being exploited
as channels of foreign interference by the People’s Republic of China.
While the EU should
continue to monitor allegations that Confucius Institutes have been used to
disseminate propaganda and restrict academic freedom, greater emphasis must be
placed on addressing broader and more impactful channels of influence—such as
state-sponsored partnerships with major research institutions, technology
transfer through joint ventures, and covert operations involving Chinese
enterprises embedded within critical infrastructure sectors.In addition, ongoing scrutiny should focus on
how Chinese state-linked actors may exert indirect influence over research
agendas, funding streams, and self-censorship practices within European higher
education institutions—particularly in areas related to sensitive topics such
as human rights and technological cooperation. Enhanced transparency around
partnerships and funding sources remains crucial to safeguarding academic
integrity.
Conclusion
The trilateral alignment of
Russia, Iran, and China presents a multifaceted and evolving threat to the
European Union’s security, stability, and strategic autonomy. While these
actors pursue distinct national agendas, their overlapping interests—whether in
the realm of cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, military cooperation, or
economic leverage—create a cumulative destabilizing effect. Russia remains the
primary source of direct military aggression and tactical cyberattacks; Iran
reinforces destabilization through proxy networks and ideological
amplification; and China plays a critical role by facilitating technological advancement,
strategic infiltration, and economic entanglement.
The European Union’s response
has developed across several dimensions: reinforcing cybersecurity and counterintelligence,
strengthening its cooperation with NATO and like-minded partners, rethinking
its approach to foreign influence in critical sectors, and supporting Ukraine
as a frontline of defense against systemic aggression. However, gaps remain—notably
in balancing economic interests with security imperatives, ensuring resilience
against sophisticated hybrid tactics, and maintaining unity among Member States in the face of complex
external pressures.
Going forward, the EU must
continue to sharpen its threat perception, streamline its policy instruments, and foster a culture
of strategic foresight. Only a coordinated and comprehensive strategy,
acknowledging the distinct yet complementary roles of Russia, Iran, and China,
can safeguard Europe’s democratic institutions, technological sovereignty, and
geopolitical stability.
|
Funded
by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of
the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European
Union or European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European
Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. |
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